Wildly Enthusiastic  About the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services by Sherman, Laura B.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 51 | Issue 1 Article 3
12-1998
"Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications
Services
Laura B. Sherman
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sherman, Laura B. (1998) ""Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services,"
Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 51: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol51/iss1/3
"Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First
Multilateral Agreement on Trade in
Telecommunications Services
Laura B. Sherman*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 62
II. THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ...................................... 63
III. THE HISTORY .............................................................................. 64
A. The GATS .......................................................................... 64
B. Negotiations over Basic Telecommunications Services ......... 65
IV. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS ..... 66
A. Scheduling Issues ............................................................... 68
B. The Reference Paper .......................................................... 71
C. Making the Reference Paper Binding ................................ 87
D. Results of the NGBT ........................................................... 88
V. THE GROUP ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS ......................... 90
A. Satellite Services .............................................................. 90
1. Scope of Commitments ................................................ 90
2. Spectrum Limitations ................................................... 91
3. International Satellite Organizations ............................ 93
B. International Services ........................................................ 94
C. U.S. Commitments ............................................................... 96
D. Results of the Group on Basic Telecommunications .......... 97
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 99
APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS .................................... 100
* Ms. Sherman is currently Communications Counsel at the law firm of Paul, Weiss,
Rifldnd, Wharton & Garrison in Washington, D.C. She was the chief lawyer for the United
States delegation to the WTO basic telecommunications negotiations, while at the Office of
the United States Trade Representative.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, telecommunications services have been provided by
national monopolies. In a sign that monopolies are a thing of the past, the
World Trade Organization's (WTO)' Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO Basic Telecom Agreement or Ba-
sic Telecom Agreement) 2 entered into force on February 5, 1998. The Ba-
sic Telecom Agreement was concluded on February 15, 1997, with sixty-
nine WTO Members3 agreeing to open to foreign competition for the first
time some or all of their basic telecommunications services markets. These
sixty-nine Members represent over 90 percent of the world's basic tele-
communications revenues. Telecommunications services is a huge and
growing market, with 1997 revenues expected to exceed $725 billion.4 A
telecom trade agreement came after two unsuccessful attempts to negotiate
multilateral commitments on basic telecommunications under the auspices
of the WTO. It was an achievement warmly welcomed by consumers and
suppliers of basic telecommunications services.5 In fact, many in U.S. in-
dustry declared themselves to be "wildly enthusiastic. 6
1. The WTO was created by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement). See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 2 (GATIT Secretariat
1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2. As described below, the commitments undertaken as a result of the WTO basic
telecommunications services negotiations are incorporated into the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) by the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (WTO 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 366 (1997).
These commitments are colloquially referred to as the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement,
although they are not technically contained in a stand-alone agreement.
3. Actually, the 69 WTO Members represent 70 contracting parties, as the European
Union is bound in addition to its 15 Member states. The 69 WTO Members represent gov-
ernments or separate customs territories with full autonomy in the conduct of their external
commercial relations. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII. Hong Kong, one of the
parties to the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, remains a WTO Member by virtue of its
status as a separate customs territory of the People's Republic of China and may participate
in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements, such as the WTO.
See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China, art. 116 (last modified Apr. 30, 1997) <http://www.info.gov.hk/hkmal
system/basiclaw.html>.
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE OUTLOOK 1998:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 30-1 (1998).
5. Anne Swardson & Paul Blustein, Trade Group Reaches Phone Pact: Experts Say
Deal Will Result in Cheaper Long Distance Rates, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1997, at A33.
6. On February 13, two days before the negotiations were to conclude, representatives
of the private sector in Geneva, who were there to observe the concluding days, greeted the
U.S. negotiating team at its morning industry briefing with signs saying "wildly enthusias-
tic."
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This Article describes the results of the negotiations on basic tele-
communications, the history of the negotiations, the difficult issues that
negotiators faced, and how those issues were resolved.
II. THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The results of the negotiations can be measured in a number of ways.
The most obvious is the quantity and quality of commitments made by the
countries involved. Sixty-nine countries made commitments to open their
markets for some or all basic telecommunications services to foreign com-
petition.7 Fifty-two countries guaranteed access to their markets for inter-
national services and facilities, with five more countries open for selected
international services. In almost all of those countries, international serv-
ices have been provided by a monopoly that will face competition for the
first time.8 Fifty-six countries agreed to open markets for all or selected
services provided by satellites.
Not only have monopolies ended for the first time in many countries,
but the competitors providing basic telecom services can be 100 percent
owned by foreigners in forty-four countries. Another twelve countries
agreed to allow foreign ownership or control of certain basic telecom
services, while thirteen countries guaranteed to allow some degree of for-
eign ownership in their basic telecom services markets.
To make these commitments of market access and foreign ownership
and control fully realizable, fifty-three countries agreed to adopt as binding
commitments the "Reference Paper," a set of procompetitive regulatory
principles. For the first time in a multilateral setting, countries agreed to
abide by competition rules.
The second way to measure the achievement of these negotiations is
by the size of the markets that will be open to competition. In this respect,
the results are particularly impressive. Prior to implementation of the re-
sults of these negotiations, only 17 percent of the top twenty telecom mar-
kets were open to competition. 0 As of the date of entry into force of the
7. A country-by-country summary of commitments is attached. The summary also
includes commitments to provide market access for value-added telecommunications serv-
ices. See infra note 23.
8. Competition in international voice telephone services, prior to January 1, 1998, ex-
isted in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Chile, New Zealand, Japan, Australia,
and Finland.
9. The Reference Paper was never formally issued as a WTO document. See
Reference Paper, FouRTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERvIcEs
436 (WTO 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 367 (1997) [hereinafter Reference Paper]. For a descrip-
tion of the Reference Paper, see infra Part WV.B.
10. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomm. Market, Re-
port and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, para. 7, 10 Comm.
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WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, 92 percent of major markets are covered
by commitments to remove restrictions on competition and foreign entry.I
Consumers will also benefit. The Clinton Administration estimates that the
average cost of international phone calls will drop by 80 percent-from
one dollar per minute on average to twenty cents per minute over the next
several years.12
Ill. THE HISTORY
A. The GATS
There is actually no free-standing WTO Basic Telecom Agreement,
but a series of commitments that compose part of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS),"3 one of the trade agreements included
within the WTO Agreement. 4 The GATS establishes binding multilateral
rules covering treatment of foreign services and service suppliers and gov-
ernment regulation of trade in services. The GATS combines elements of
both trade and investment agreements. As described below, some of the
substantive obligations of the GATS apply automatically to all WTO
Members; other obligations only apply in the event that a Member under-
takes specific sectoral commitments. These sectoral commitments are in-
cluded in a Member's individual Schedule of Commitments, which is an-
nexed to the GATS.15 Thus, the extent of a WTO Member's obligations
can only be established by reference to the text of the GATS and the
Member's Schedule.
Reg. (P & F) 750 (1997) [hereinafter Foreign Participation Order].
11. Id.
12. The WTO Telecom Agreement: Results and Next Steps: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. 16 (1997) (statement of Hon. Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representa-
tive).
13. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, Annex lB, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIAONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS 325 (GATTr Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
14. Other agreements include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Trade-
Related Investment Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, and the Understanding on
Dispute Settlement.
15. A "protocol" is the device used to annex Schedules of Commitments and lists of
MFN exceptions of individual WTO Members to the GATS, making them integral parts of
the GATS. GATS, supra note 13, art. XX.
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B. Negotiations over Basic Telecommunications Services
Basic telecommunications was one of the four service sectors left un-16 17
resolved by the Uruguay Round.16 As with financial services, the stum-
bling block was the "free-rider" problem, created by the structure of the
GATS itself. The GATS requires that WTO Members provide "Most-
Favoured-Nation" treatment (MFN)'g to like services and service suppliers
from other WTO Members, regardless of the commitments undertaken by
any individual Member. This obligation precludes a WTO Member from
discriminating among services or service suppliers of other Members. It
means that a Member that commits to open its market for a certain service
cannot close its market on a selective basis to like services or service sup-
pliers from any WTO Member.
The other essential obligations envisioned by the GATS are "market
access" 9 and "national treatment.' ' 2 The application of these obligations is
subject to negotiation on a sector-by-sector basis and is contained in indi-
vidual Schedules of Commitments.2 As a result, not all WTO Members
16. The other sectors were financial services, maritime, and movement of persons. The
"Uruguay Round" refers to the trade negotiations begun at Punta Del Este, in 1986, and
concluded formally in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994.
17. Kenneth Freiberg, World Trade Organization: Second Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Related Decisions, Introductory Note, 35
I.L.M. 199 (1996).
18. GATS, supra note 13, art. II.
19. Id. art. XVI. This provision requires WTO Members to "accord services and service
suppliers of any other [WTO] Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for
under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule," and to
refrain from imposing certain types of quantitative restrictions, economic needs tests, or
local incorporation requirements in those services sectors where the WTO Member has un-
dertaken specific market access commitments. Id. A quantitative restriction is a cap on the
number of permitted suppliers. An economic needs test is a limitation on the number of
service suppliers based on an assessment of whether the market will be able to absorb new
service suppliers without harm to existing service suppliers.
20. Id. art. XVII. Article XVII is a nondiscrimination rule that requires a WTO Member
to treat like services and service suppliers from other WTO Members no less favourably
than it treats its own services and service suppliers. Id. Article XVII states that:
[in the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and quali-
fications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppli-
ers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of serv-
ices, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and
service suppliers.
Id.
21. Under the GATS, id. art. XX, each WTO Member negotiates a Schedule of Com-
mitments covering the different services sectors. If a WTO Member agrees to make market
access commitments in any particular service, that Member must list quantitative restric-
tions and discrimination in favor of domestic firms that it wishes to maintain. According to
GATS, id. art. XIX, such restriction or discrimination is subject to negotiations during the
original negotiations or subsequent rounds.
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have the same level of commitments with respect to market access or na-
tional treatment.
The automatic application of the MFN principle creates imbalance in
those service sectors where many countries are unwilling to make market
access commitments. It was apparent in mid-1992 that there would be a
lack of market access and national treatment commitments in the basic
22telecommunications sector. Only a few WTO Members, including the
United States, were willing to make market access commitments in basic
telecommunications services as part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations.
The scope of commitments was limited. A few WTO Members undertook
commitments only in a single subsector, such as facsimile services, or only
through limited technological means, such as cellular telephone services.2
As a result, Members of the services negotiating group began to discuss
the possibility of extending negotiations in this sector beyond the general
deadline of December 1993.24
IV. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP ON BASIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, trade ministers agreed to
extend the period of negotiations regarding commitments in basic tele-
communications.2 The Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommuni-
cations established a "Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications"
(NGBT) to carry out comprehensive negotiations on basic telecommuni-
26cations, with a final report to the Council for Trade in Services due on
22. GATS, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Negotiations on Basic
Telecommunications, Note by the Secretariat, TS/NGBT/W/l/Rev.1, para. 2 (June 10,
1994) [hereinafter June 1994 Note]. The June 1994 Note can be found at <http://www.wto.
orglwtolddffep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
23. Id. para. 9. As a result of the Uruguay Round, about 60 WTO Members, including
all major U.S. trading partners, made market access commitments for Value-Added Tele-
communications Services (VATS). VATS includes electronic mail, voice mail, on-line in-
formation and data base retrieval, electronic data interchange, enhanced facsimile services,
code and protocol conversion, and on-line information and data processing. A number of
WTO Members made commitments for VATS in their Schedules submitted as part of the
basic telecommunications negotiations, bringing the total number of WTO Members with
commitments in VATS to 69.
24. Id. para. 2.
25. The postponement was contained in a "Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on
Basic Telecommunications" taken at the time the WTO Agreement was signed. Decision on
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTiLATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 461 (GATT Secretariat 1994)
[hereinafter Ministerial Decision on Negotiations].
26. The Council for Trade in Services is composed of all WTO Members and is
charged with facilitating the operation of the GATS and furthering its objectives. See
GATS, supra note 13, art. XXIV.
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April 30, 1996. The Ministerial Decision on Negotiations stated that
"[n]egotiations shall be entered into on a voluntary basis with a view to the
progressive liberalization of trade in telecommunications transport net-
works and services" and that they "shall be comrehensive in scope, with
no basic telecommunications excluded a priori." At the same time, nego-
tiators suspended application of the MFN principle in this sector.8 This
meant that during the period of negotiations and until new commitments
entered into force, WTO Members were not bound to provide MFN treat-
ment in the basic telecommunications sector. Even more important, WTO
Members retained the ability to take an MFN exemption at the conclusion
of the negotiations, if that Member considered that the overall set of mar-
ket access commitments remained insufficient. During the negotiating
period, Members agreed to observe a "standstill," and not to take any
measures in telecommunications services that would improve their negoti-
ating position.3°
The NGBT began work in May 1994 with seventeen WTO Members
participating.3 Negotiators viewed the process as one that should lead to
radical departures from existing telecommunications services regimes-
the provision of these services on a competitive basis.32 Issues to be ad-
dressed included scheduling, competitive safeguards, use of frequencies,
27. Ministerial Decision on Negotiations, supra note 25, paras. 1, 2.
28. The "Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications," an Annex to the
GATS, suspended the MFN obligation until April 30, 1996, or the date of implementation
of any agreement on basic telecommunications set by the NGBT. In the absence of the
agreed-upon suspension contained in the Annex on Negotiations, the MFN obligation
would have automatically applied in the basic telecommunications sector as it does in all
other services sectors. In addition, if a WTO Member decided that it wanted to take an
MFN exemption at a later date, it would have to obtain agreement of three-fourths of WTO
Members to do so. See GATS, Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, WTO
Agreement, Annex IB, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTiLATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIoNs: THE LEGAL TExTs 364, para. 2 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1196
(1994) (referring to art. IX, para. 3 of the WTO Agreement on waivers from WTO obliga-
tions).
29. The "Annex on Article II Exemptions," which is part of the GATS, allows a WTO
Member to schedule limited exemptions to its MFN obligations. GATS, Annex on Article
II Exemptions, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 352 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33
I.L.M. 68 (1994).
30. June 1994 Note, supra note 22, para. 3.
31. Ministerial Decision on Negotiations, supra note 25, para. 5. The original Members
were Australia, Canada, Chile, the European Union and its Member States, Finland, Hong
Kong, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.
32. GATS, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report of the Meeting of
6 May 1994, TS/NGBT/1, para. 5 (June 10, 1994). The Report of the Meeting of 6 May
1994 can be found at <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/ddflep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
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accounting rates, and regulatory issues such as the maintenance of an in-
dependent regulator." As one of the first items of business, the negotiators
agreed that they lacked sufficient information about the telecommunica-
tions services markets of Members needed to develop requests for market
access. In July 1994, the Secretariat of the WTO distributed a question-
naire to "explore each government's regulatory environment regarding the
supply of basic telecommunications networks and services."3
A. Scheduling Issues
Negotiators focused on scheduling issues in the early stages of the
negotiations. These included questions relating to how to schedule services
such as call-back or country direct; whether accounting rates16 are
"measures" of Members for purposes of the GATS;37 and whether a
"public interest" test must be scheduled as a market access limitation.38
33. Id. para. 9.
34. GATS, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Questionnaire on Basic
Telecommunications, Note by Secretariat, TS/NGBT/W/3 (July 15, 1994). The Question-
naire on Basic Telecommunications can be found at <http:/www.wto.orglwto/ddf/ep/pub
lic.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998). Although responses were requested for September 1994,
the bulk of responses were submitted in late 1994 and early 1995. The questionnaire cov-
ered definitions, market structure, the extent and conditions under which competitive supply
of basic telecommunications is permitted, and regulatory issues. Id.
35. GATS, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Review of Outstanding
Issues, Note by Secretariat, TS/NGBT/W/2, para. 4 (July 8, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Secre-
tariat Note]. The 1994 Secretariat Note can be found at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998). Call-back is a method
of providing international services. Typically, a call is placed by the originating caller over-
seas to the call-back provider's switch located in the United States. The switch then auto-
matically returns the call, and upon completion, provides the caller with a U.S. dialtone. All
traffic is thus originated at the U.S. switch, and the calls are billed at U.S. tariffed rates,
which are usually much lower than those of the originating country.
36. The current international accounting rate system was developed as part of a regu-
latory tradition in which international telecommunications services were supplied through a
bilateral relationship between hational monopoly carriers. The "accounting rate" refers to a
rate negotiated between two carriers on a particular international route which is intended to
allow each carrier to recover the cost of the respective facilities each has provided for ter-
minating an international call. Most operating agreements provide that the two carriers split
the accounting rate 50:50. At settlement, each carrier nets the number of minutes of com-
munication it originated against the number of minutes originated by the other carrier. The
carrier that originated the larger number of minutes reimburses the other carrier an amount
calculated by multiplying the net difference in minutes generally by one-half the accounting
rate. Each carrier's portion of the accounting rate is referred to as the settlement rate. Mat-
ter of Int'l Settlement Rates, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,806, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1 (1997) [hereinafter Benchmarks Order]; Cable & Wireless v. FCC, Memorandum Opin-
ion, Order and Certificate, 12 F.C.C.R. 21,692, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1137 (1997).
37. 1994 Secretariat Note, supra note 35, para. 11.
38. Id. para. 21.
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Negotiators agreed on the fundamental principle of a "positive list" ap-
proach to scheduling." This means that a participant need only list those
services of categories in which it is making a commitment. In the tele-
communications sector, it was necessary to distinguish between subsec-
tors-such as international, long-distance, or local-voice telecommunica-
tions services-and technologies, such as cellular services.4 ' Negotiators
concluded that it was not necessary to schedule specific ways of offering a
particular type of telecommunications service, such as call-back 4 If a
Member committed to allow international service to be provided, it was
not necessary to describe the ways in which that service could be provided.
Alternatively, if a Member made no commitment on international service,
then it was not necessary to specifically exclude particular ways in which
.... 42
international service could be provided.
Questions relating to accounting rates occupied negotiators' attention
in the first year of the NGBT.43 Negotiators addressed the question of
whether accounting rates set by international service providers were
"measures" of a WTO Member for purposes of the GATS and, therefore,
subject to the discipline of the GATS. This would include, among other
things, the obligation to provide MFN treatment. The GATS defines
"measures by Members" as measures taken by governmental authorities or
nongovernmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by a govern-
mental authority." Since accounting rates differ dramatically from route to
route, imposition of an MFN obligation would have a dramatic effect on
• 45
the operation of almost all international service providers.
39. June 1994 Note, supra note 22, para. 6(ii).
40. This distinction and the "positive list" approach were further clarified by the
Chairman of the negotiating group in January 1997. See infra note 118 and accompanying
text.
41. See infra note 137 and accompanying text for a discussion of scheduling issues.
42. Nonetheless, some Members who made no commitments on international services
also specifically excluded call-back. See Indonesia, Schedule of Specific Commitments,
FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 234 (WTO 1997),
GATS/SC/43/Suppl.2 (Apr. 11, 1997); Pakistan, Schedule of Specific Commitments,
FouRTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICEs 311 (WTO 1997),
GATS/SC167/Suppl.2 (Apr. 11, 1997). The Schedule of Specific Commitments for Indone-
sia and Pakistan can be found at <http:l/www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited
Nov. 1, 1998).
43. Settlement rates under the current international accounting rate system remain sig-
nificantly above the cost of terminating international telephone calls and have been the
subject of much multilateral and bilateral discussion, as well as specific actions in the
United States. See Benchmarks Order, supra note 36, at paras. 2, 15.
44. GATS, supra note 13, art. I, para. 3(a).
45. For example, accounting rates for U.S. carriers range from $0.12 per minute with
the United Kingdom to $1.25 with Jamaica. Federal Communications Commission, Con-
solidated Accounting Rates of the United States (June 1998).
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The argument that accounting rates are "measures of a Member" is
based on the fact that accounting rates are negotiated between operators,
and, according to the International Telecommunication Regulations, op-
erators make these agreements as "administrations or recognized operating
agencies (RPOAs). 46 Administrations and RPOAs are defined by the Con-
stitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as a gov-
ernmental department and an entity designated by a governmental depart-
. 47
ment, respectively. Since most international carriers are either part of or
owned by the government or have been designated by a government as an
operating agency, the acts of these carriers would constitute "measures of a
Member."
The contrary argument is that the designation of a RPOA does not
confer any governmental authority on the operators, so operators cannot be
deemed to "exercise powers delegated by" any governmental body, as re-
.. 48
quired by the GATS definition. Although the ITU Constitution refers to a
RPOA "authorized" by a government, the "authorization" can refer to any
process a particular country uses to designate private entities to participate
directly in the work of the ITU.49 Negotiators never reached consensus on
how to treat accounting rates, and as a result, a number of WTO Members
took MFN exceptions for application of accounting rates.50 Their action
46. International Telecommunication Regulations, Dec. 9, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No.
102-13, art. I, para. 1.5 (1991). The term "recognized operating authority" was changed to
"recognized private operating agency" in the 1992 version of the ITU Constitution and
Convention in Geneva.
47. Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Dec.
22, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-34, Annex, paras. 1002, 1008 (1996).
48. See Matter of Int'l Comm. Policies Governing Designation of Recognized Private
Operating Agencies (POAs), Notice ofInquiry, 95 F.C.C.2d 627 (1983). In fact, the concept
of a RPOA arose from the attempt of the ITU to allow U.S. private carriers to participate
directly in the work of the ITU. Id. para. 24.
49. Id.
50. For example, India took an MFN exception for "measures including the application
of different accounting rates for different operators/countries covered by International Tele-
communication Services Agreements between Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited [the gov-
ernment operator] and various foreign operators." India, List of Article II (MFN) Exemp-
tions, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 232 (WTO
1997), GATS/EL/42/Suppl.1 (Apr. 11, 1997). The following countries took similar excep-
tions: Antigua and Barbuda, List ofArticle II (MFN) Exemptions, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 14 (WTO 1997), GATS/EL/2 (Apr. 11, 1997);
Bangladesh, List of Article H (MFN) Exemptions, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 40 (WTO 1997), GATS/EL/8 (Apr. 11, 1997); Pakistan,
List of Article H (MFN) Exemptions, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TRADE IN SERVICES 321 (WTO 1997), GATS/EL/67/Suppl.1 (Apr. 11, 1997); Sri Lanka,
List of Article H (MFN) Exemptions, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TRADE IN SERVICES 395 (WTO 1997), GATS/EL/79 (Apr. 11, 1997); and Turkey, List of
Article H (MFN) Exemptions, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN
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leaves open the question of whether the vast majority of WTO Members
that did not take MFN exceptions are vulnerable to charges that their inter-
national service providers cannot maintain differential accounting rates.
Negotiators, however, reached a "gentlemen's agreement" not to bring the
issue of discriminatory accounting rates to WTO dispute settlement for at
least a few years.5'
B. The Reference Paper
Early in the negotiations, negotiators recognized the need to develop
a set of competitive safeguards against anticompetitive practices. These
safeguards would be measures designed to ensure that monopolies or for-
mer monopolies of basic telecommunications could not exploit their domi-
nant position to distort market forces and impede the ability of competitors
to supply networks or services for which commitments would be made. In
addition, negotiators discussed the desirability of establishing or main-
taining independent regulators, with "independent" understood to mean
that regulatory functions have been removed from the purview of the basic
telecommunications operators and assigned to a separate body.53 In De-
cember 1994, U.S. negotiators convened a meeting of selected delegates to
initiate a dialogue on regulatory objectives. This select group met regularly
thereafter to draft what became the "Reference Paper," the core regulatory
obligations that would bring major changes to telecommunications serv-
ices."
The process of drafting the Reference Paper began with the United
States distributing a paper entitled, "Procompetitive Regulatory and Other
SERVICES 431 (WTO 1997), GATS/EL/88/Suppl.2 (Apr. 11, 1997). The preceding list of
Article II (MFN) Exemptions can be found at <http:llwww.wto.orglwtolddf/ep/public.html>
(visited Nov. 1, 1998).
51. Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications, S/GBT/4, 36 I.L.M. 354, 369
para. 7 (1997), states:
It is the understanding of the Group that: the application of such accounting rates
would not give rise to action by Members under dispute settlement under the
WTO; and that this understanding will be reviewed not later than the commence-
ment of the further Round of negotiations on Services Commitments due to begin
not later than 1 January 2000.
52. 1994 Secretariat Note, supra note 35, para. 15.
53. Id. para. 16.
54. This group was known as the "Room A Group," after the room at the WTO where
it first met. Subsequent meetings, informally chaired by the chief Japanese delegate to the
NGBT, met at the Japanese Embassy. The hospitality of the Japanese and the informal lead-
ership of the Japanese "chair" contributed significantly to the successful drafting of the Ref-
erence Paper. Initial participants represented the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Ja-
pan, Korea, and the European Union. Later sessions were attended by representatives of
Brazil, Singapore, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines, in addition to the original partici-
pants.
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Measures for Effective Market Access in Basic Telecommunications
Services." In this paper, the United States stated that it was
[E]ssential that, for purposes of progressive liberalization of trade in
basic telecommunications services, market access commitments must
be accompanied by commitments to:
- set disciplines for interconnection of competing basic telecommun-
ications suppliers;
- provide competition safeguards on dominant carriers;
- ensure transparency of regulatory processes; and
- guarantee the independence of regulators. 5
When the United States submitted its draft offer in the negotiations in
July 1995, it included a detailed set of regulatory principles that it prom-
ised to adhere to if the negotiations succeeded. The U.S. principles in-
cluded requirements for dominant carriers to provide fair and economical
interconnection at nondiscriminatory, publicly-tariffed, cost-based rates-
this to be accomplished in a manner that permits service suppliers to buy
only the facilities or services they actually need to provide basic telecom-
munications service-and to provide equal access, including dialing parity.
The United States also offered to require number portability, publish ac-
counting rates, and administer universal service obligations in a transpar-
ent, competitively neutral manner. The U.S. offer also contained commit-
ments relating to preventing a dominant operator from abusing its market
power, permitting public comment on regulatory decisions, and maintain-
ing a regulator who was independent from any operator or any government
agency that exercises control over an operator.
Based on contributions from Canada, Australia, and the European
Union, Japan developed a composite set of regulatory principles in Octo-
ber 1995 for discussion by the Room A Group. The composite text did not
refer to obligations of a "WTO Member" because the negotiators decided
they were developing a "Reference Paper" and not something binding on
any Member. As a result, negotiators wrote the Reference Paper in the pas-
55. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the
United States, Pro-competitive Regulatory and Other Measures for Effective Market Access
in Basic Telecommunications Services, S/NGBTIW/5 (Feb. 9, 1995). The Effective Market
Access Communication from the United States can be found at <http://www.wto.org/
wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
56. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the
United States, Draft Offer on Basic Telecommunications, S/NGBTIW/12/Add.3 (July 31,
1995) [hereinafter July 31 Draft Offer]. The July 31 Draft Offer can be found at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
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sive voice without any statement as to who would carry out the obliga-
tions.57 Negotiators circulated a draft of the Reference Paper to all NGBT
participants in December 1995 and January 1996.51 The Chairman of the
NGBT described the Reference Paper at the January 1996 meeting "as a
tool to help participants arrive at an understanding of the kinds of com-
mitments they might undertake on regulatory matters."5 '
In fact, the Reference Paper never answers the question of what en-
tity will carry out the obligations contained in it or how those obligations
specifically will be carried out. To accommodate the different political and
legal structures of WTO Members, negotiators agreed that the Reference
Paper would focus on effective outcomes, rather than the means or proc-
esses by which those outcomes would be achieved. Negotiators agreed that
the principles needed to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate differ-
ences in market structures and regulatory philosophies among the various
participants. No single uniform regulatory system should be imposed. In
some countries, the obligations in the Reference Paper would be carried
out by a government ministry of telecommunications or justice; in others,
there may be a regulatory agency; still others may assign responsibilities to
a mixture of government agencies. Some countries may rely on antitrust
law, while others may develop a complicated set of regulatory principles.
The objective was to ensure certain results, a level playing field for new
entrants, not to determine the means by which the results would be
achieved. A description of the terms of the Reference Paper follows.
Definitions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers. 60
A definition of "users" was essential to define the scope of the inter-
connection obligation. It is extremely broad, covering the end-user or retail
customer, be it a natural person or a juridical person, and also any inter-
mediary service supplier, such as a reseller of telecommunications services
57. Since New Zealand does not have a separate telecommunications regulator, it ob-
jected to efforts to have the document refer to a "regulator" as the responsible entity.
58. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report on the Meeting of
15 December 1995, S/NGBT/11, para. 5 (Dec. 22, 1995); WTO, Negotiating Group on Ba-
sic Telecommunications, Report on the Meeting of 26 January 1996, S/NGBT/12, para. 6
(Feb. 14, 1996) [hereinafter Report on the Meeting of 26 January 1996]. These reports can
be found at <http:lwww.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
59. Report on the Meeting of 26 January 1996, supra note 58, para. 6.
60. Reference Paper, supra note 9.
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provided by others. The terms "service consumer" and "service supplier"
were chosen because they are defined terms in the GATS. 6,
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecommunications
transport network or service that
(a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or
limited number of suppliers; and
(b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted
in order to provide a service.
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect
the terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the
relevant market for basic telecommunications services as a result of:
(a) control over essential facilities; or
(b) use of its position in the market.62
These two definitions describe the type of telecommunications serv-
ice provider that could act anticompetitively and, therefore, should be
subject to competitive safeguards and interconnection obligations. The
U.S. regulatory principles had referred to a "dominant operator," defined
as an operator with market power.63 However, this was a U.S. term of art
not used elsewhere. Australia proposed that each WTO Member would
identify the relevant carriers in its Schedule, but this idea was rejected.
Everyone agreed that the definition could not be limited to a single sup-
plier, that is, solely to a monopoly provider, because the disciplines would
cease as soon as there was a new entrant. Negotiators decided to focus on
the control of facilities as the operative way of defining the relevant carri-
ers. The Canadian delegation offered a definition of "essential facilities" as
facilities that "are available only on a monopoly basis (de facto or de jure);
cannot be economically or technically substituted; and are required by a
competitor for the supply of a service.
Some thought this definition was too narrow and would not cover
former monopolies now subject to some competition. So the reference to
61. "'Service consumer' means any person that receives or uses a service." GATS, su-
pra note 13, art. XXVIII(i). "'Service supplier' means any person that supplies a service."
Id. art. XXVIII(g). GATS defines "person" as a "natural person or a juridical person," each
of which are further defined in art. XXVIII(k) and (1), respectively.
62. Reference Paper, supra note 9.
63. The U.S. paper defined market power as "the ability to charge prices above a com-
petitive level. In basic telecommunications services, market power is particularly relevant
with respect to control over bottleneck facilities for interconnection to public telecommuni-
cations transport networks." See July 31 Draft Offer, supra note 56.
64. Informal Communication from Canada-Regulatory Principles (Nov. 15, 1995) (on
file with author).
[Vol. 5 1
"WILDLY ENTHUSIASTIC"
de facto or de jure monopoly was replaced by "exclusively or predomi-
nantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers." 65 This was
conditioned, as Canada had suggested, by a further requirement that the
facilities "cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in or-
der to provide a service."6 Negotiators agreed that both parts of the defini-
tion were necessary or else facilities would be deemed essential even
though they were easily duplicated by new carriers. The relevant facilities
were narrowed to those of a "public telecommunications transport network
or services," terms that are defined broadly in the GATS Annex on Tele-
communications.67
The European Union argued that it was not control over essential fa-
cilities that should define interconnection obligations or competitive safe-
guards, but rather market power. The European Union suggested assigning
interconnection responsibilities to suppliers with significant market power.
This is a term of art in EU directives where it is defined as carriers with
68
more than 25 percent market share. Others believed that such a definition
was overbroad and would impose obligations on carriers that could not act
anticompetitively. There was agreement that some carriers that did not
control essential facilities (for example, because duplication of those fa-
cilities was economical) could still act anticompetitively and hinder market
access by new entrants. Therefore, negotiators agreed to include a concept
of market power, applying the interconnection obligations and competitive
safeguards to incumbent carriers that can "materially affect the terms of
participation (having regard to price and supply) either as a result of con-
trol of essential facilities or through use of market power." 69 In other
words, these types of carriers are referred to as "major suppliers."
This term should not be taken literally but should be read only in
light of its definition. Major suppliers must be able to exercise market
power in the relevant market, whether as a result of their control of essen-
tial facilities or as shown by their ability to raise prices and restrict output
in the relevant market. Market share is not the sole determining factor.
65. Reference Paper, supra note 9.
66. Id.
67. See GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXrS 359, para. 3(b)-(c) (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1192-93 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS, Annex on Telecommunications].
68. Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Interconnec-
tion in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability
through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199)
32 [hereinafter EU Interconnection Directive].
69. Reference Paper, supra note 9.
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While AT&T may literally be a major supplier of international voice tele-
communications services in the United States, in the view of U.S. officials
70based on decisions by the FCC, it is not a "major supplier" for purposes
of the Reference Paper obligations. It is also important to remember that a
carrier can be a "major supplier" in its home market and international
routes terminating in its home market, but not for other markets where it
cannot exercise market power.
1. Competitive safeguards
1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of pre-
venting suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from en-
gaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices.
1.2 Safeguards
The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in
particular:
(a) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;
(b) using information obtained from competitors with anti-
competitive results; and
(c) not making available to other service suppliers on a timely
basis technical information about essential facilities and
commercially relevant information which are necessary for
71them to provide services.
Initially, the United States proposed a fairly detailed set of competi-
tive safeguards, promising to: (1) prohibit dominant carriers from cross-
subsidizing nonregulated services, (2) requiring certain dominant carriers
to adopt structural separation or cost accounting safeguards, and (3) re-
quiring a dominant carrier to make publicly available network information
necessary to facilitate interconnection or the supply of competitive tele-S 72
communications services. There was general agreement that prevention
of cross-subsidization and misuse of information, as well as transparency
requirements, was essential to promote competition and allow new entrants
into the market. Much of the discussion focused on how detailed the obli-
gations would be. In line with the idea of establishing broad principles, the
negotiators agreed to a general principle-Members should adopt meas-
70. Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Declared Non-Dominant for Int'l Serv., Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 17,963, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 111 (1996); Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclas-
sified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 3271, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63
(1995).
71. Reference Paper, supra note 9, paras. 1.1, 1.2.
72. July 31 Draft Offer, supra note 56.
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ures to prevent anticompetitive behavior-and an illustrative, but not an
exclusive list, of the types of behavior that would be anticompetitive.
Paragraph 1.1 requires a Member to have in place measures that pre-
vent joint or collusive behavior as a result of the reference to "suppliers
who, alone or together, are a major supplier."73 This provision, for exam-
ple, requires that a WTO Member have laws or regulations to prohibit joint
refusals to engage in resale or provide interconnection. It also means that a
Member must have measures in place to prevent anticompetitive cross-
subsidization and misuse of information. Finally, it requires that measures
be in place to require timely disclosure of technical and commercial in-
formation.74
The phrasing of paragraph 1.1, however, does not require a Member
to pursue anticompetitive conduct or to ensure a particular result. In other
words, it does not require a Member to guarantee that anticompetitive con-
duct will not occur or to stop such conduct. The language in paragraph 1.1
is very different from that used in other contexts in which positive meas-
ures have been required in order to ensure particular results.75 For example,
the obligations regarding interconnection in paragraph 2 are phrased as
"will be ensured," meaning that not only do measures have to be in place
with respect to interconnection, but WTO Members must carry them out.
76
Failure to adopt or maintain measures that would prevent anticompetitive
conduct could be cause for dispute settlement, but failure to enforce those
measures would not.
The Reference Paper does not define the specific measures that must
be adopted in order to carry out the provisions of paragraph 1. Negotiators
intended, however, that Members adopt specific measures to address the
issues listed in paragraph 1.2. Preventing anticompetitive cross-
subsidization may mean requiring the structural separation of various lines
of business of a major supplier, such as fully separate subsidiaries. Pre-
vention may be accomplished by requiring nonstructural accounting sepa-
ration. Similarly, protecting proprietary information may mean adopting
prohibitions on unauthorized release of competitors' business and market-
73. Reference Paper, supra note 9.
74. Id.
75. Cf GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 67, para. 2(a) n.14 ('This
paragraph is understood to mean that each Member shall ensure that the obligations of this
Annex are applied with respect to suppliers of public telecommunications transport net-
works and services by whatever measures are necessary."); North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 13, art. 1305, 32 I.L.M. 605, 655 (1993)
(Each "party shall ensure that the monopoly does not use its monopoly position to engage
in anticompetitive conduct in [certain] markets.").
76. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 2.2.
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ing plans, trunking configurations, peak usage, network architecture, and
equipment types, supported by adequate penalties. In addition, Members
need to adopt measures to require public availability of technical and
commercial information, such as standards, network changes, additions or
deletions, processing requests, timing changes, and billing arrangements."
2. Interconnection
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public
telecommunications transport networks or services in order to allow
the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another sup-
plier and to access services provided by another supplier, where spe-
cific commitments are undertaken.78
Paragraph 2.1 defines the scope of the interconnection obligations
contained in the Reference Paper.79 Negotiators agreed that the definition
needed to be very broad in order to cover all types of services. The defini-
tion refers to "linking with suppliers" rather than "linking of suppliers" to
reinforce the idea that paragraph 2 obligations guarantee access to the net-
. 80
works or services necessary to provide services. The phrase "where spe-
cific commitments are undertaken" limits the interconnection obligation to
those services for which a WTO Member has scheduled commitments. For
example, if a country has made no market access commitment for interna-
tional voice telephony services, then it assumes no interconnection obliga-
tions with respect to providers of international services.
The definition, however, is written broadly enough to cover all possi-
ble services. The European Union suggested that interconnection be de-
fined as the "physical and logical" linking of two suppliers, explaining that
logical linking was intended to include interconnection to data bases and
advanced network functionalities. Negotiators concluded, however, that
"linking" without any modifiers was broader and covered all contingen-
cies, including satellite links, leased lines, closed user groups, facilities-
based service and resale, and some not yet created.
Paragraph 2 builds on obligations already existing in the GATS An-
nex on Telecommunications. Paragraph 5 of the Annex requires that a
Member ensure that any service supplier of another Member is accorded
77. Id. para. 1.2.
78. Id. para. 2.1.
79. Originally this definition was included in the definitions section. At the insistence
of the EU Delegation, it was moved to paragraph 2.
80. As with the definition of "essential facilities," the interconnection obligation is
aimed at providers of "public telecommunications transport network" and "public telecom-
munications transport service."
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access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and
services on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions for the
supply of a service included in its Schedule.
2.2 Interconnection to be ensured
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any
technically feasible point in the network. Such interconnection is pro-
vided:"'
Paragraph 2.2 sets the standard that WTO Members must ensure
major suppliers meet in providing interconnection. As noted above, the in-
troductory sentence is written as an absolute obligation:
"interconnection... will be ensured."8 2 The obligations are extremely de-
tailed as described below. With the caveat that interconnection need only
be provided at "technically feasible points" in the network, a major sup-plier has three sets of obligations regarding interconnection:
(a) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including
technical standards and specifications) and rates and of a
quality no less favourable than that provided for its own
like services or for like services of non-affiliated service
suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates.4
This is the interconnection version of a national treatment and MFN
obligation. It requires the major supplier to treat other telecommunication
services and suppliers as it treats its own services and affiliated service
suppliers, as well as treating all nonaffiliated telecommunication services
and service suppliers equally and without discrimination. 8 The obligation
prohibits a major supplier from favoring its own subsidiaries or affiliates
over other suppliers. Paragraph 2.2(a), thus, requires a major supplier not
to discriminate in location, information, ordering procedures, ordering in-
tervals, provisioning intervals, billing arrangements, maintenance and
81. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 2.2.
82. Id.
83. The interconnection obligations imposed on incumbent local exchange carriers by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Communications Act) also apply at any technically
feasible point within the carrier's network. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 101(a), §
251(c)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B) (1998).
84. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 2.2(a).
85. This paragraph was based on the EU Interconnection Directive, supra note 68, arts.
6(a) and 7, para. 2, but was broadened to define nondiscrimination by inserting the refer-
ences to treatment provided affiliates and nonaffiliates.
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testing, characteristics of interconnection, credit terms, and warranties or
guarantees.
(b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including tech-
nical standards and specifications) and cost-oriented rates
that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic
feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier
need not pay for network components or facilities that it
does not require for the services to be provided.86
This text achieved the U.S. negotiating objectives of imposing broad
interconnection requirements on dominant carriers in a manner consistent
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Many of its obligations derive
from the Telecommunications Act" and the EU Interconnection Direc-
tive. This one sentence encompasses many requirements. Interconnection
must be timely. The terms and conditions under which interconnection is
provided must be transparent and reasonable. The technical standards and
specifications for interconnection must be transparent. Rates for intercon-
nection must be cost-oriented,89 transparent, and reasonable. Reasonable-
ness in this respect will be judged in economic terms. Interconnection ele-
ments must be "unbundled." The wording here is taken directly from
Article 7, paragraph 4 of the EU Interconnection Directive and also tracks
the Telecommunications Act.
Originally, New Zealand and Australia had proposed qualifying all
elements of the interconnection obligation by requiring it to be provided to
the extent that it is technically and economically feasible. The United
States suggested that such a qualification provided too much leeway and
asked whether New Zealand and Australia could consider putting language
elsewhere as a narrower qualification. As a result, the negotiators added a
reference to "economic feasibility" with respect to rates and dropped the
reference to technical feasibility.
The negotiators did not try to define the scope of the many obliga-
tions contained in this paragraph. Thus the meaning of "timely," "cost-
oriented," "sufficiently unbundled," "reasonable," "unbundled," and
"economic feasibility" will only be determined in dispute settlement. By
86. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 2.2(b).
87. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1998).
88. EU Interconnection Directive, supra note 68, arts. 4, para. 2, 6(a), 7, paras. 2, 4.
89. Negotiators decided to use "cost-oriented," instead of "cost-based" because of the
difficulty of determining actual costs in most countries. U.S. negotiators also favored "cost-
oriented" because it is the term used in section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
47 U.S.C. § 271 (1998).
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using concepts taken from the Telecommunications Act and the EU Inter-
connection Directive, at least some of the negotiators hoped that the inter-
pretation of these words, as in the United, States and Europe, could be
precedents for interpretation in the WTO context.9°
(c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termi-
nation points offered to the majority of users, subject to
charges that reflect the cost of construction of necessary
additional facilities.9 '
Negotiators rejected an attempt to require unbundling only where
technically feasible. This seemed to be an excuse to deny interconnection.
Instead, negotiators agreed that technical feasibility was not an issue. Ne-
gotiators assumed that there were standard interconnection points that
were normally available, and as long as a service supplier was willing to
pay the additional cost, it could obtain interconnection at other points in
the network.
Next, the Reference Paper imposes additional obligations with re-
spect to interconnection to make sure that new entrants seeking it will have
the information necessary to obtain interconnection.
2.3 Public availability of the procedures for interconnection negotia-
tions
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier
will be made publicly available.?
This paragraph requires that procedures for obtaining interconnection
must be publicly available so that all parties know their rights and obliga-
tions. A number of the negotiators had proposed originally that this para-
graph require not only the availability of the procedures, but also a time
90. Obviously, the scope of interconnection obligations in the United States is the sub-
ject of fierce debate and unending litigation. The FCC's Implementation of the Local Com-
petition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996), established nationwide pricing rules for intercon-
nection between new entrants and incumbent local exchange carriers. These rules were in-
validated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and are now being considered
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998). The scope for interpretation of the interconnection obliga-
tions can vary. For one interpretation see Coalition of Service Industries, Statement on the
WTO Group on Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper (Oct. 1997) (visited Nov. 1,
1998) <bttp://www.itu.int/intset/indu/csistat.htm>.
91. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 2.2(c).
92. Id. para. 2.3.
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frame in which the major supplier had to conclude interconnection nego-
tiations. Canada and the United States, as well as the European Union,
suggested the need to set a timetable or reasonable time limits for inter-
connection. Negotiators, however, decided that it would not be possible to
set a time limit. Rather, they circumscribed the ability of a major supplier
to delay interconnection indefinitely by inserting the word "timely" in
paragraph 2.2(a) and in a later provision dealing with settlement of inter-
connection disputes.
2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available
either its interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection of-
fer.93
This paragraph adds transparency to the interconnection process and
prevents a major supplier from negotiating wildly different interconnection
arrangements with different new entrants. It makes more concrete the re-
quirements in paragraph 2.2(a) and (b) that terms, conditions, and rates be
transparent and nondiscriminatory. In its draft offer of July 1995, the
United States had stated that dominant carriers would be required to pro-
vide interconnection at publicly-tariffed rates.94 In the negotiation of the
Reference Paper, the United States sought a requirement that the actual
interconnection agreements negotiated by carriers be publicly available.
Other negotiators thought it sufficient to require publication of a standard
set of interconnection terms, conditions, and rates. Some objected that in-
terconnection agreements are confidential business documents that should
not be available to the public.9' To address the different approaches, nego-
tiators agreed that a major supplier would have to make publicly available
either its interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer.96
93. Id. para. 2.4.
94. July 31 Draft Offer, supra note 56.
95. Article XX of the EU Interconnection Directive, supra note 68, has an exception
for confidential business information. In fact, negotiators agreed that Article III bis of the
GATS would allow a Member to protect confidential information, the "disclosure of which
would.., prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or pri-
vate." GATS, supra note 13, art. I bis. So an additional provision protecting confidential
business information in interconnection agreements was not necessary.
96. The Commission requires that interconnection agreements be publicly available and
has noted a number of times that it does not believe that the existence of a reference inter-
connection offer is sufficient to prevent discrimination. See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1996); see,
e.g., Cable & Wireless v. FCC, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certificate, 12 F.C.C.R.
21,692, para. 32, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1137 (1997).
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2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlement
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major sup-
plier will have recourse, either:
(a) at any time or
(b) after a reasonable period of time which has been made
publicly known
to an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as
referred to in paragraph 5 below, to resolve disputes regarding appro-
priate terms, conditions and rates for interconnection within a reason-
able period of time, to the extent that these have not been established
previously.9
Article VI of the GATS requires governments to offer suppliers of all
services an avenue for recourse of administrative decisions. This provi-
sion, however, could not be used to seek redress for interconnection deci-
sions made by private carriers. Negotiators all agreed on the necessity for a
domestic enforcement mechanism and a time frame in which interconnec-
tion had to be provided.98 This avenue for redress is separate from WTO
dispute settlement. The issues included what entity would be charged with
dispute settlement, what would be the scope of dispute settlement, how
long would it take to conclude, and what would be the result of dispute
settlement. Paragraph 2.5, as finally agreed, represented a number of com-
promises. Dispute settlement can be done by any "independent domestic
body," not just a regulator. This took into account the situation in New
Zealand, for example, which does not have a telecommunications regulator
but rather depends on domestic courts. In determining the timing in which
a dispute can be brought, each Member can decide whether a service sup-
plier seeking interconnection can resort to the domestic body at any time
or only after a reasonable period of time that has been established and
made known.
The domestic body is charged with "resolving disputes" regarding
terms, conditions, and rates, a phrasing that gives the independent body
more leeway than the original wording that stated the body "[c]an impose
appropriate terms, conditions and rates."99 The manner of resolving dis-
putes can be by reference to terms, conditions or rates already established,
or based on the facts presented to it. Finally, while the negotiators did not
want to require a time limit on private interconnection negotiations, they
did require that the domestic body resolve the interconnection dispute
97. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 2.5.
98. Article 9, paragraph 2 of the EU Interconnection Directive, supra note 68, is simi-
lar.
99. Earlier draft of Reference Paper (on file with author).
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"within a reasonable period of time." As with the terms used in paragraph
2.2, there is no definition of a "reasonable" period of time. Some of the
negotiators did note, however, that the four years needed to resolve the in-
terconnection dispute between Telecom New Zealand and the new entrant,
Clear, was not reasonable.
3. Universal service
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service
obligation it wishes to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded
as anti-competitive per se, provided they are administered in a trans-
parent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are
not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service
defined by the Member.'°°
This paragraph provides for general obligations with regard to uni-
versal service, without defining the scope of universal service or the spe-
cific mechanism to be employed to achieve it. The first sentence makes
very clear that each WTO Member will define the scope of universal
service according to its own needs. The second sentence tracks the U.S.
proposal that universal service be provided in a transparent, nondiscrimi-
natory and competitively neutral manner and that it be as little of a burden
as possible to provide the required service. Negotiators did not intend the
phrase, "[s]uch obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per
se," to limit the scope of obligations but merely to respond to India's con-
cern that any universal service system could be attacked as anticompetitive
regardless of the way it was implemented.
The European Union proposed limiting the costs to be shared by op-
erators to the net cost for covering a basic telecommunications services
package, rather than the historical costs. A number of delegations opposed
this idea on the grounds that it prescribed a Member's freedom to set uni-
versal service obligations. India argued strongly that the universal service
obligation be limited to "non-discriminatory and transparent," but other
delegations said that was not sufficient.'0'
Some negotiators argued that a paragraph on universal service was
unnecessary because universal service was a form of domestic regulation,
100. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 3.
101. In fact, India limited its obligations on universal service in its Schedule of Specific
Commitments. See INDIA, Schedule of Specific Commitments, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 224 (WTO 1997), GATS/SC/42/Suppl.3 (Apr.
11, 1997). The India Schedule of Specific Commitments can be found at
<http:llwww.wto.orglwto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998) (Universal service ob-
ligations will "be administered in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.").
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already covered by the general obligations of GATS Article VI. But repre-
sentatives of many least developed countries thought reference to universal
service was essential. In fact, this paragraph adds valuable clarification in
order to eliminate any doubt that the kinds of disciplines included in Arti-
cle VI cover universal service.1°2
4. Public availability of licensing criteria
Where a licence is required, the following will be made publicly avail-
able:
(a) all the licensing criteria and the period of time normally
required to reach a decision concerning an application for
a licence and
(b) the terms and conditions of individual licences.
The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the ap-
plicant upon request."t
This paragraph adds to the existing obligations in GATS Article III.
Article I requires that, where an authorization is needed, authorities
should inform the applicant of the decision within a reasonable period of
time after an application is completed and, at the request of the applicant,
provide information concerning the status of the application without undue
delay. Article III is limited in its application to situations in which a li-
cense is required. As a result of paragraph 4, WTO Members must ensure
that, if a license is required, they will make publicly available all licensing
criteria and the terms and conditions of all individual licenses. The reasons
for denying a license application must be made known to the applicant. In
addition, the paragraph requires each Member to establish a time period
that is "normally" required to reach licensing decisions.1 4 It does not re-
quire a Member to set a deadline by which it must make licensing deci-
sions. A WTO Member does not violate its commitments if it occasionally
exceeds the "normal" period. Most of the demands for a standard licensing
period came from European and Japanese negotiators and were directed
toward curbing the ability of the FCC to hold license applications for
months without action or explanation. 05
102. See Lee Tuthill, The GATS and New Rules for Regulators, 21 TLECOM PoL'Y 783,
790 (1997).
103. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 4.
104. The FCC established a "normal" processing time of 90 days in the Foreign Partici-
pation Order, supra note 10, para. 328.
105. The Japanese were particularly upset by an application by KDD America, Inc., for
authority under section 214 of the Communications Act to resell non-interconnected private
lines between the United States and various international points, which was filed in August
1995. It was granted in part in March 1996, and the remainder in September 1996. KDD
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This paragraph changed significantly during the negotiations, losing a
number of elements. The United States originally proposed requiring
Members to make publicly available information concerning new or re-
vised laws, regulations and administrative guidelines, and allowing public
comments prior to adoption. It also proposed requiring Members to solicit
public comment on license applications as the FCC does. Other delega-
tions pointed out that GATS Article Ill contains a requirement that new
measures be made publicly available. Consequently, part of the U.S. pro-
posal was unnecessary. No other delegation supported the idea of public
comment, so eventually the United States agreed to delete the requirement.
A number of delegations suggested phrasing aimed at invalidating the
FCC's use of public interest criteria in licensing. Japan suggested adding a
sentence that "no criteria that are not made publicly available in advance
will be used to refuse or to select licensees."' The European Union sug-
gested that public interest objectives should not be used to refuse li-107
censes. These suggestions were rejected by negotiators as unnecessary
since GATS Article VI already governed licensing conditions.
5. Independent regulators
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any
supplier of basic telecommunications services. The decisions of and
the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all
market participants.lns
This paragraph addresses the potential for conflict of interest that
arises when the body regulating the telecommunications industry is also
the major telecommunications operator. The text achieves part of the U.S.
goal for independence of the regulator. It requires that the regulator be
separate from, and not accountable to, any operator. It does not require that
the regulator be independent of any government ministry. In fact, para-
graph 5 allows the government telecommunications ministry to be the
regulator.
The second sentence imposes on the regulator the obligation to be
impartial with respect to all market participants. This adds to the obliga-
tions of regulators contained in GATS Article VI-to administer all meas-
ures of general application in a reasonable, objective, and impartial man-
America, Inc., Order, Authorization and Certificate, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,828 (1996); KDD
America, Inc., Order, Authorization and Certificate, 11 F.C.C.R. 11,329 (1996).
106. Reference Text on Regulatory Principles in Basic Telecommunications Services,
Japanese text dated Dec. 15, 1995 (on file with author).
107. EU fax dated Dec. 14, 1995 (on file with author).
108. Reference Paper, supra note 9, para. 5.
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ner. Paragraph 5 requires impartiality in particular situations "with respect
to all market participants."" This specifically imposes a requirement not
to favor the local incumbent.
6. Allocation and use of scarce resources
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, in-
cluding frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in
an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. The
current state of allocated frequency bands will be made publicly avail-
able, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific
government uses is not required.1
Negotiators realized that access to scarce resources is essential to
gaining market share. This text imposes some discipline on allocation of
frequencies, numbers, and rights of way, among other scarce resources.
The requirement for transparency and nondiscrimination repeats obliga-
tions already imposed by GATS Article III and general obligations of
MFN and national treatment. The obligation to act in an objective and
timely manner, however, is new. Some negotiators argued that "timely"
should be deleted because it implies that a Member would have to allocate
scarce resources quickly. The general consensus, however, was that
"timely" describes the manner in which a particular decision is made and
did not require allocation of all resources.
The final sentence requires that Members make publicly available
current frequency allocations, other than those used for specific govern-
ment uses. Most likely, GATS Article Im would impose the same require-
ment, but negotiators felt it important to reiterate the transparency re-
quirement with regard to frequency allocation. Similarly, GATS Article III
and Article XIV would allow Members to protect frequencies assigned for
sensitive government operations. But negotiators preferred to reiterate the
ability to protect government use.
C. Making the Reference Paper Binding
Negotiators considered a number of ways to make the regulatory
principles in the Reference Paper binding obligations and therefore subject
to WTO dispute settlement. In January 1996, the United States distributed
a paper describing the ways in which these commitments could be made
binding.II The paper stated that a cover note to a Schedule of Commit-
109. Id.
110. Id. para. 6.
111. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the
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ments would not create a binding obligation, and the status of headnotes
and footnotes in a Schedule was unclear. Amendment of the text of the
GATS or of the Annex on Telecommunications to include the regulatory
principles would certainly make them binding, but amendment was not a
feasible alternative. Pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement, an
amendment affecting Members' rights and obligations under the GATS
only becomes effective upon ratification by two-thirds of WTO Mem-b 112
bers. Thus, the United States and others concluded that the most feasible
way to ensure that the regulatory principles would be binding was to in-
clude them as "additional commitments" permitted by GATS Article
XVIII." 3 As a result, most delegations agreed to include the Reference Pa-
per in their Schedules in the additional commitments column.
D. Results of the NGBT
The NGBT produced market access offers by many countries. But the
quantity and quality of those offers, as of April 30, 1996, were not suffi-
cient to enable the United States to make a final commitment to provide
unlimited market access in the basic telecommunications sector. At that
time, forty-seven countries had submitted offers. 14 Of those, only eleven
had offered to provide open market access for all domestic and interna-
tional services and facilities, allow 100 percent foreign investment, and
adopt the procompetitive regulatory principles contained in the Reference
Paper." While a number of countries in Latin America and Europe had
made offers, these offers were limited to only certain services, contained
significant investment restrictions, or set a date of implementation signifi-
cantly beyond the agreed-upon implementation date of January 1, 1998.'6
United States, Scheduling Regulatory Principles, S/NGBT/W/18 (Jan. 23, 1996). The
Scheduling Regulatory Principles Communication from the United States can be found at
<http:llwww.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
112. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. X.
113. GATS, supra note 13, art. XVIII states: "Members may negotiate commitments
with respect to measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles
XVI or XVII, including those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters."
114. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.
115. The 11 were Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
116. For example, France maintained a limit of 20% foreign ownership in radio net-
works. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the
European Communities and their Member States, Draft Offer on Basic Telecommunica-
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In addition, there were few offers from Asia, one of the most dynamic re-
gions of the world.1
7
In addition to the absence of a critical mass of offers to solve the
free-rider problem, two other issues remained unresolved on April 30-the
first related to the need for a safeguard regarding international services,
and the second to the scope of offers for satellite services.
Rather than removing its offer of market access and taking an MFN
exemption, the United States urged a further period of negotiation. As a
result, negotiators agreed that there should be further time to modify or
supplement Schedules. while maintaining the agreed-upon timetable for
implementation. On April 30, 1996, the NGBT transmitted its final re-
port1 to the Council on Trade in Services. The Report included Schedules
of Commitments (from forty-seven countries) and Lists of Article II Ex-
emptions (from one country),11 9 a draft "Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services,"' 20 and a "Decision on Commitments in
Basic Telecommunications." The Fourth Protocol set the implementation
date for January 1, 1998.121 On that date, Scheduled Commitments would
go into effect and the MFN suspension would end.
The Council on Trade in Services then decided to establish a group
on basic telecommunications to continue negotiations and created a
"window" between January 15 and February 15, 1997, during which WTO
tions, S/NGBT/W/12/Add.10 (Oct. 16, 1995). Chile offered to bind access only to long-
distance and international but not local services. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Tele-
communications, Communication from Chile, Draft Offer on Basic Telecommunications,
S/NGBTIW/12/Add.16 (May 6, 1996). Spain's market access commitments would not be
effective until 2003. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communica-
tion from the European Communities and their Member States, Draft Offer on Basic Tele-
communications, S/NGBT/W/12/Add.10 (Oct. 16, 1995). The Draft Offers on Basic Tele-
communications can be found at <http:llwww.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited
Nov. 1, 1998).
117. Only Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines made offers. None
of those countries offered 100% market access or national treatment.
118. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report of the Negotiating
Group on Basic Telecommunications, S/NGBT/18 (Apr. 30, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 354, 362
(1997).
119. India claimed an MFN exception for the application of variable accounting rates for
terminating international traffic in its market. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecom-
munications, Communication from India, List of Article 11 Exemptions, S/NGBT/W/19
(Apr. 26, 1996). The India List of Article II Exemptions can be found at
<http:lwww.wto.orglwto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
120. The original protocol was adopted in April 1994 at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round. The Second Protocol annexed the results of negotiations on financial services in
1996. WTO: Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
Related Decisions, 35 I.L.M. 199 (1996).
121. This date was later extended to February 5, 1998. See infra text accompanying note
170.
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Members could "supplement or modify" their Schedules or lists of Article
II exemptions annexed to the Protocol. 2 A Member which had not done so
previously could also submit a list of Article II exemptions during that
window.2 2 Finally, Members who had not submitted Schedules of Com-
mitments could do so at anytime.' 4 In essence, the negotiating period was
extended until mid-February 1997-an additional ten months.
V. THE GROUP ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT) began extended ne-
gotiations in July 1996.'2 In addition to obtaining improved market access
commitments and additional adherents to the Reference Paper, the GBT
needed to resolve outstanding questions relating to satellite services and
international services.
A. Satellite Services
1. Scope of Commitments
Shortly prior to the conclusion of the NGBT, negotiators recognized
that the scope of offers for satellite services was not clear. Although Mem-
bers had adopted a "positive list" approach to scheduling, offers varied
tremendously in their approach to satellites. The United States draft offer
referred to a variety of satellite services-domestic/international satellite
services and satellite link capacities, satellite earth stations, international
switching, and other international gateway facilities. In other Schedules,
however, such as those of Japan, New Zealand and Norway, the word
"satellite" did not appear. Yet, through bilateral consultations, it was
clear that these countries intended to grant market access and national
treatment to satellite services. Other countries revealed that they had not
considered satellite services in drafting their offers, while others categori-
cally stated that their offers did not include satellite services.
122. WTO, Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, S/L/19 (Apr. 30,
1996), 36 I.L.M. 354, 365, para. 3. (1997).
123. Id.
124. Id. para. 6.
125. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report of the Meeting of
19 July 1996, S/GBT/M/1 (Sept. 11, 1996). This Report can be found at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998).
126. An analysis prepared by the United States delegation of the 34 Schedules tabled at
the end of April 1996 showed that 18 Schedules made no mention of satellite services at all,
while the rest referred to satellites in a variety of ways.
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To resolve this evident confusion and other questions relating to
scheduling that had arisen, 27 the Chairman of the GBT issued "Notes for
Scheduling Basic Telecom Services Commitments. 1 2 The document
contains assumptions "applicable to the scheduling of commitments" and
was intended to ensure "the transparency of [Members'] commitments and
to promote a better understanding of the meaning of commitments."' 29 The
note makes clear that unless a Schedule otherwise indicates, the listed tele-
com. services include local, long-distance, and international, provided ei-
ther on a facilities basis or through resale, and delivered through any tech-
nological means (e.g., all types of cable, wireless, satellites).)3 It also
makes clear that the subsector "private leased circuit services" covers the
provision of any type of network capacity for use in supplying other listed
telecom services.1
2. Spectrum Limitations
Through the initial negotiations, negotiators had considered the
question of how to deal with technical constraints on the number of suppli-
ers-an issue of particular concern in the satellite sector, but also in other
wireless sectors. The issue arose because the amount of radio spectrum
available for use is naturally limited. It is not physically possible to allow
unlimited use of spectrum without causing interference that would render
the service inoperable. Spectrum managers, in addition to considering
physical limitations, also need to provide for government uses and tech-
nological advancements that may make spectrum use more efficient. The
question was whether nondiscriminatory limitations on the number of sup-
pliers, established strictly because of limited radio spectrum, needed to be
scheduled as a market access limitation in order to be maintained. Arti-
cle XVI, paragraph 2 of the GATS lists the types of market access limita-
tions that can be maintained if they are scheduled as limitations. Paragraph
2(a) of that list specifies "limitations on the number of service suppliers
127. Members' offers also varied in their treatment of the type of technology over which
a service can be delivered (e.g., wire-based or radio-based) and whether service could be
provided through resale.
128. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Note by the Chairman,
Revision, Notes for Scheduling Basic Telecom Services Commitments, S/GBT/W/2/Rev.1
(Jan. 16, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 371 (1997).
129. Id.
130. Id. para. 1.
131. Id. para. 2.
132. 1994 Secretariat Note, supra note 35, para. 5.
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whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service
suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test.'
' 33
Some delegations argued that GATS Article XVI, paragraph 2(a) did
not apply to allocation or assignment of spectrum because the limitations
were strictly technical. In that sense, they are not limitations on market ac-
cess, but are instead covered by the obligations of Article VI.'34 Article VI,
paragraph 4 requires that measures used to determine which suppliers will
be licensed to use spectrum need to be based on "objective and transparent
criteria" and "not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of
the service."135 Others pointed out, however, that as technology changes,
the number of suppliers that can use limited spectrum may increase. Ac-
cordingly, numerical limits on suppliers may represent market access bar-
riers rather than technical limitations. 136 In the absence of answers to these
questions, by the end of April 1996, the offers of twenty-six Members
contained entries in the market access limitations column indicating that
commitments for radio or wire-based services were "subject to the avail-
ability of spectrum." These words, for example, were contained in the U.S.
offer and were meant to allow limiting the number of suppliers if spectrum
was not available or for spectrum management purposes.
The insertion of these words, while providing spectrum managers
comfort, raised further questions. The first was whether the entry was suf-
ficient to maintain limits on the number of suppliers because of scarce
spectrum. A WTO panel would only allow the limitation to be effective if
it were a legitimate Article XVI market access limitation. If the panel
found it were not a "numerical limit," as referred to in Article XVI, a
Member might not be able to limit the number of suppliers. If a panel
found the limitation to be a valid one, it might also read the words to im-
pose an obligation to allow suppliers to use any available spectrum, not-
withstanding any spectrum management policies held by the Member.
These contrary results led the Chairman of the GBT to issue a clarifying
note on which Members could rely.
The Chairman's Note, Market Access Limitation on Spectrum Avail-
ability, 37 recognized the importance of protecting legitimate spectrum
management policies but noted that insertions in the market access column
133. GATS, supra note 13, art. XVI, para. 2.
134. Id. art. VI.
135. Id. para. 4.
136. Id. art. VII.
137. WTO, Group on Basic Telecommunications, Chairman's Note, Market Access
Limitations on Spectrum Availability, S/GBT/W/3 (Feb. 3, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 372
(1997).
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of the words "subject to spectrum availability" might not achieve that goal.
The Chairman noted that "[s]pectrum/frequency management is not, per
se, a measure which needs to be listed under Article XVI" of the GATS."'
Rather, it is subject to Article VI and other relevant provisions of the
GATS. In addition, for those countries incorporating the Reference Paper
as additional commitments, spectrum/frequency management would be
subject to paragraph 6 of the Reference Paper. Therefore, the Chairman
suggested that such words be deleted from Schedules. Most Members who
had the words in their Schedules in April 1996 removed them by the con-
clusion of the negotiations in February 1997. As a result, spectrum man-
agement decisions will be judged by the standards of GATS Article VI and
paragraph 6 of the Reference Paper and by whether they conform to the
obligation to provide national and MFN treatment-decisions will need to
be objective, transparent, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Decisions
obviously made to favor a national champion will be subject to dispute
settlement, while decisions based strictly on technical issues, such as inter-
ference with existing licensees, will not be challengeable.
3. International Satellite Organizations
In the course of determining the treatment to be accorded satellite
services and providers, negotiators needed to determine the status of two
major satellite service providers-the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the International Maritime Satel-
lite Organization (Inmarsat). INTELSAT was created in 1971 by treaty for
the purpose of providing fixed satellite service for voice, data, and audio
communications.'39 Inmarsat was created in 1979, also by treaty, to provide
maritime communications, and where practicable, aeronautical, and land
mobile communications.' 40 These two organizations (known as
"international or intergovernmental satellite organizations" or "ISOs") are
the original global satellite systems.1 INTELSAT and Inmarsat are both
in the process of reorganization and privatization of some operations,
which will bring them into competition with privately-owned satellite
service providers.
138. Id.
139. See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi-
zation "INTELSAT," Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532. INTELSAT cur-
rently has 141 signatories.
140. See Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT), Sept. 3, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 9605. Inmarsat currently has 77
signatories.
141. A number of global satellite systems are currently being developed, with deploy-
ment of the first system occurring in November 1998.
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Negotiators had to answer two questions regarding ISOs: whether the
ISOs themselves received the benefit of WTO commitments and whether
private companies affiliated with an ISO did. In both cases, the answer
turned on whether the entity was a "service supplier of a WTO Member,"
since GATS obligations are framed in those terms.' 42 Under GATS Article
XVIII, "service supplier" means any person that supplies a service, while
"person" means either a natural person or a juridical person. 43 A juridical
person of another Member means a legal entity duly "constituted or other-
wise organized under the law of that other Member, and... engaged in
substantive business operations in the territory of that Member or any
other Member."' 44 There was general consensus among negotiators that the
ISOs themselves were not "service suppliers of a Member" since they were
created by treaty and not "organized or constituted" under the laws of a
particular Member. 45
Affiliates of ISOs, however, were "service suppliers of a Member"
and derived benefit from WTO commitments. Even though these affiliates
were likely to be entities created by an ISO, in which an ISO and ISO sig-
natories maintain ownership interests, they would be incorporated under
the laws of a WTO Member. As such, they met the definition. 146
B. International Services
The issue of market access for the provision of international tele-
communications services bedeviled the negotiations. The United States, in
particular, was concerned that competitive markets would face serious
market distortions from carriers from WTO Members that did not make or
effectively implement full market access commitments in international
services.'47 The United States argued that distortion was possible in two
ways. The first would arise from "one-way bypass" of the accounting rate
system. Carriers from closed markets would have the ability to exacerbate
the traffic imbalance (and, therefore, the settlement payments) of carriers
142. See, for example, GATS, supra note 13, art. II, stating that: "each Member shall
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member..."; also see GATS, supra note 13, art. XVII, stating that: "each Member shall
accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member ......
143. Id. art. XXVIH(g), (j).
144. Id. art. XXVII(m)(i).
145. The FCC reached this same conclusion in Amendment of the Comm'n's Regulatory
Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and Int'l Satellite
Servs. in the United States, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 24,094, para. 14, 10 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 587 (1997) [hereinafter Disco II Order].
146. See id. para. 136.
147. See Benchmarks Order, supra note 36, para. 3.
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from competitive markets by providing service into the competitive market
• . 148
over private lines. This is because traffic sent over resold private lines is
outside the accounting rate system. Carriers from competitive markets
would not have the same opportunity to engage in similar traffic routing in
the opposite direction because there is only one carrier that can terminate
traffic.
One-way bypass, according to the United States, would further exac-
erbate U.S. outpayments under the current accounting rate system. Many
more calls are originated in the United States for settlement purposes and
the U.S. settlement deficit grew steeply from 1990 to 1996. "In 1996, the
U.S. settlement deficit totaled $5.4 billion, double what it was in 1990."149
The second method of distorting competition would arise from the
ability of a carrier from a closed market to cross-subsidize its affiliate in a
competitive market. Although the parent and affiliate would have to ex-
change traffic under the accounting rate system, any payments made to the
parent would be intracorporate transfers and not real "costs" to the affli-
ate. The affiliate in the competitive market could therefore engage in a
price squeeze by charging lower rates for international services than other
carriers in the competitive market.'50
At the April 1996 meeting of trade ministers from the Quad coun-
tries, the FCC presented a detailed description of the effect of one-way
bypass of the accounting rate system on competitive markets and suc-
ceeded in convincing Quad partners that this concern was a real one. There
was consensus that protection of conditions of competition in the licensing
• • 152
Member's market was a legitimate licensing objective, but no consensus
on whether a WTO Member could refuse to issue a license to prevent one-
way bypass. There was little agreement on the seriousness of the cross-
subsidization or price squeeze potential. Attempts to draft principles for a
licensing condition to address the problem failed during the first round of
negotiations. Further discussions during the second round produced no re-
sults either. Each Member was thus left to address the potential for com-
petitive distortions in its market as it wished, within the confines of its
GATS obligations. 53
148. Id. para. 242.
149. Id. para. 13.
150. Id. para. 208.
151. The Quad countries are Japan, the European Union, the United States, and Canada.
152. GATS, supra note 13, Article VI says nothing about the policy objectives which
may be pursued through the imposition of a licensing requirement. The purpose of Article
VI is to ensure that where licensing conditions are imposed, they do not operate as unneces-
sary barriers to trade. See Tuthill, supra note 102, at 788.
153. The United States chose to address the issue by reiterating its ability to condition or
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C. U.S. Commitments
As the leader of the negotiations, the United States submitted a mar-
ket-opening offer in July 1995. This offer provided unlimited market ac-
cess and national treatment in all basic telecommunications sectors, except
intrastate (local) services, and included additional commitments of pro-
competitive regulatory principles. Pending legislation on intrastate serv-
ices, the United States offered to bind the status quo. The initial U.S. of-
. 156
fer maintained restrictions on access to submarine cable landing licenses,
restrictions on access to INTELSAT and Inmarsat, 57 and limitations on
foreign investment in common carrier radio licenses.
As a result of passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,158 the
United States improved its offer in February 1996 to include unlimited ac-
cess to the intrastate market. 59 Prior to the April 30, 1996 deadline, the
United States revised its offer to clarify that indirect foreign ownership
was permitted, even though restrictions remained on direct foreign owner-
ship. 160
Further improvements in the U.S. offer, made in conjunction with
improvements in the offer of the European Union, came in November
1996. The United States removed the restriction on access to submarine
cable landing licenses. As a result, the United States committed to provide
market access and national treatment to all basic telecommunications
deny any license relating to radio communications, submarine cables, or earth stations on a
nondiscriminatory basis, as necessary, that pose a very high risk to competition in the U.S.
market. See Foreign Participation Order, supra note 10, para. 13; Disco 11 Order, supra
note 145, para. 7.
154. July 31 Draft Offer, supra note 56.
155. The initial U.S. offer was submitted prior to the passage of the 1996 Telecommuni-
cations Act.
156. The Submarine Cable Landing Act, 47 U.S.C. § 34 (1998), authorizes the President
to license foreign owners of submarine cables landing or operating in the United States.
This authority was delegated to the FCC by Exec. Order No. 10,530, 19 Fed. Reg. 2709
(1954).
157. Satellite Communications Act of 1962,47 U.S.C. §§ 701,751 (1998).
158. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
159. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the
United States, Draft Offer on Basic Telecommunications, S/NGBT/W/12/Add.3/Rev. I (Feb.
26, 1996). The Draft Offer can be found at <http://www.wto.orgtwto/ddf/ep/public.html>
(visited Nov. 1, 1998).
160. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Communication from the
United States, Conditional Offer on Basic Telecommunications (Revision),
S/NGBT/W/12/Add.3/Rev.2 (Apr. 30, 1996). The Conditional Offer can be found at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> (visited Nov. 1, 1998). Restrictions on direct
foreign ownership in common carrier radio licenses are contained in 47 U.S.C. § 310
(1998).
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services. This included local, interexchange (long-distance within and
between states), and international services, delivered through any network
technology (wire-based, radio-based, satellite networks, and cable televi-
sion). Service could be provided either on a facilities basis or through re-
sale of existing facilities.16' All types of basic services were included:
Voice Data
Telex Telegraph
Facsimile Private leased circuits
Satellite Mobile (PCS, cellular and paging) 62
The U.S. offer limited direct ownership of a common carrier radio li-
cense (wireless services) by a foreign government, a non-U.S. citizen, or a
non-U.S. corporate entity to 20 percent. One hundred percent indirect
ownership through U.S. holding companies is allowed. There are no re-
strictions on nationality of officers or directors in the licensee or its parent
companies. COMSAT retains its monopoly access to INTELSAT and In-
marsat. The United States included the Reference Paper as "additional
commitments."'
163
In response to inadequate market access offers from some countries
and in order to maintain a balance of commitments regarding types of tele-
communications services, the United States excluded from its scheduled
coverage one-way satellite transmission of direct-to-home, direct broadcast
services and digital audio radio services, and submitted an MFN excep-
tion'64 for those services.
D. Results of the Group on Basic Telecommunications
The GBT resulted in significant improvements in market access
commitments and in the number of WTO Members adopting the regula-
tory principles in the Reference Paper. Annexed to the "Report of the
Group on Basic Telecommunications' ' 65 are Schedules from fifty-five
Members (sixty-nine countries, as the Member States of the European
Communities are counted as one country) and nine lists of Article II ex-
emptions.' 66 The Report noted that these Schedules and lists would be at-
161. Laura B. Sherman, World Trade Organization: Agreement on Telecommunications
Services (Fourth Protocol to General Agreement on Trade in Services), Introductory Note,
35 I.L.M. 354, 359 (1997).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Communication from the United States, List of Article If (MFN) Exemptions,
S/NGBT/W/9 (Feb. 15, 1997).
165. WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Report of the Group on
Basic Telecommunications, S/GBT/4 (Feb. 15, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 369 (1997).
166. Id. Of these 69 countries, 55 included the Reference Paper in their Schedules.
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tached to the Fourth Protocol to the GATS in replacement of those at-
tached on April 30, 1996.67
Commitments were scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1998, a
little more than ten months from the conclusion of the negotiations. This
extended period was necessary for WTO Members to carry out domestic
ratification procedures and to bring laws and regulations into conformity
with scheduled commitments. Many WTO Members considered the WTO
Basic Telecom Agreement as a treaty or international agreement, requiring
legislative action. The United States considered the WTO Basic Telecom
Agreement as an extension of the WTO Agreement, the conclusion of
which was foreseen by Congress when it approved the WTO Agreement.
The United States also did not need congressional action to implement its
scheduled commitments, as these commitments were consistent with ex-
• 169
isting law.
The Fourth Protocol noted that if all Members had not signed the
Protocol by November 30, 1997, those who had signed would decide
whether the effective date of January 1 should be changed. By November
30, 1997, only fifty WTO Members had signed the Fourth Protocol.
70
These Members met a number of times in December but failed to reach
€. 171
agreement on a date for entry into force. Finally, on January 26, 1998,
the Council on Trade in Services 72 agreed that commitments would be ef-
fective on February 5, 1998, and that WTO Members who had not yet
signed the Fourth Protocol could do so by July 31, 1998. As of that date,
Brazil, Ghana, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines had not
Forty-eight countries had submitted Schedules by April 30, 1996, with 33 including the
Reference Paper.
167. Id. para. 9.
168. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3555(b) (1998) (setting objec-
tives for conclusion of negotiations on basic telecommunications services).
169. On November 26, 1997, the FCC adopted new rules governing foreign participa-
tion in the U.S. telecommunications market consistent with U.S. WTO obligations. See
Foreign Participation Order, supra note 10, and Disco II Order, supra note 145. These or-
ders became effective on February 9, 1998. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation
in the U.S. Telecomm. Market, Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6219, 6220 (1998).
170. Although there were 69 Schedules of Commitments, 70 WTO Members had to sign
the Fourth Protocol, as the European Union signs for itself and each of the Member States
signs separately.
171. They did agree to extend the date to July 31, 1998, until which WTO Members
could sign the Fourth Protocol. As a result, 13 more WTO Members signed after December
31, 1997.
172. The ability of the WTO Members who had signed the Fourth Protocol to decide on
entry into force expired on December 31, 1997. As a result, the Council on Trade in Serv-
ices, composed of all WTO Members and charged with facilitating the operation of the
GATS and furthering its objectives, made the decision. See GATS, supra note 13, art.
XXIV.
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yet signed . As a result, these WTO Members are not bound by their
scheduled commitments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Implementing the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement will be no less
challenging than negotiating it was. Effective competition needs more than
simple deregulation or market opening contained in WTO Member Sched-
ules of Commitments. It will be some time before the real effect of the
agreement can be measured, but the successful conclusion of the negotia-
tions is evidence that liberalization is inevitable.
173. Even though the deadline of July 31, 1998, has passed for signing the Fourth Pro-
tocol, WTO Members are free at any time to improve their scheduled commitments. So the
six WTO Members who failed to sign the Fourth Protocol can still bring their commitments
into effect by submitting a Schedule to the Council on Trade in Services for adoption.
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SUMMARY OF SCHEDULED COMMITMENTS
WTO BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT
All commitments are effective as of February 5, 1998, unless oth-
erwise noted. Unlimited foreign investment permitted unless otherwise
noted. Asterisk denotes that the WTO Member has not ratified the
Fourth Protocol, and therefore its commitments are not binding.
Antigua & Barbuda-Market access and national treatment for enhanced
service suppliers (including Internet), mobile, PCS, trunked radio, and
closed user groups. Mobile and fixed satellite transport services may be
provided through arrangements with exclusive operator. Market access and
national treatment for all other services as of 2012. Adopted the Reference
Paper. MFN exemption for treatment accorded to CARICOM members
with regard to terrestrial-based mobile services.
Argentina *-Market access and national treatment for domestic data and
telex, domestic and international fax, paging, trunked radio and leased cir-
cuits (with a preference given to existing supplier until November 8,
2000). Duopoly for cellular; access for PCS to be decided in "the light of
present and future needs." Market access and national treatment for all
other services as of November 8, 2000, including those provided via non-
geostationary, non-fixed satellite services. Adopted the Reference Paper.
MFN exemption for access to geostationary fixed satellite systems.
Australia-Market access and national treatment for all services. Majority
Australian ownership required in Vodafone. Foreign ownership in Telstra
of up to 35 percent of initial sale (11.7 percent of total equity) allowed,
with a limit of 5 percent per individual or associated group of foreign in-
vestors. Also, limits on the amount of individual foreign ownership in
Optus.
Austria-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
Bangladesh-Two private operators provide local and long-distance serv-
ices in competition with government operator. Four licenses issued for
cellular. All service suppliers must use facilities of government operator,
including VSAT and gateway earth station services. No regulatory com-
mitments. MFN exemption on accounting rates.
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Barbados-Market access and national treatment for enhanced services
(including Internet) and VSAT services; market access and national treat-
ment for mobile terrestrial and satellite services as of January 1, 1999; all
other services reserved to exclusive suppliers until January 1, 2012.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Belgium *-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
Belize-Market access (but no national treatment) for trunked radio serv-
ices and teleconferencing as of January 1, 2003, and for enhanced services
and paging as of January 1, 2008. Trunked radio services and paging must
be provided through joint venture with Belizean national. Adopted the
Reference Paper.
Bolivia-Market access and national treatment for local data, telex, tele-
graph, fax, closed user groups, and mobile services (cellular, paging, PCS,
mobile satellite). Market access and national treatment for all domestic
long-distance and international voice and data services as of November 28,
2001. Local service limited to existing companies. Adopted limited set of
regulatory principles.
Brazil*-Market access and national treatment for enhanced services,
paging and nonpublic domestic and international services for closed user
groups. Duopoly for analog/digital cellular mobile service. One hundred
percent foreign ownership of nonpublic service providers; 49 percent limit
on cellular and satellite service suppliers until July 20, 1999, thereafter
none. Commitment to bind outcome of future reform legislation which is
expected to cover public and nonpublic services within one year of enact-
ment. Use of foreign-licensed GSO space segment facilities allowed
whenever they offer better technical, operational or commercial condi-
tions. MFN exemption for telecommunications services supplied for dis-
tribution of radio or television programming for direct reception by service
consumers. No regulatory commitments.
Brunei-Local service reserved for up to ten years after privatization of
government operator. Two operators have exclusivity in international
services until 2010. New licenses in cellular may be issued in 2010.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
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Bulgaria-Market access and national treatment for closed user groups
and VSAT (not connected to the public switched network), data, paging,
mobile data. Market access and national treatment as of January 1, 2003,
for resale of public voice, telegraph/telex, and cellular voice. Market ac-
cess and national treatment for all other services and facilities on January
1, 2005. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Canada-Market access and national treatment (with a limit of 46.7 per-
cent foreign ownership) for all services except fixed satellite services, in-
ternational services and submarine cables. Market access and national
treatment for international services as of October 1, 1998, but subject to
routing restrictions in favor of Canadian facilities until January 1, 2000
(except for fixed satellite services between Canada and points in the
United States); market access and national treatment for fixed satellite
services in 2000, with 100 percent foreign ownership, and submarine cable
landings as of October 1, 1998, with 100 percent foreign ownership. One
hundred percent foreign ownership also permitted for resellers. No routing
requirements on mobile satellite services between points in Canada and
between Canada and points in the United States. Routing requirements on
all satellites end as of March 1, 2000. No date fixed for end to routing re-
strictions on Canada to Canada points (other than by satellite). Licenses to
operate earth stations for provision of Canada-United States fixed satellite
service may be limited until March 1, 2000. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Chile*-Market access and national treatment for long-distance and inter-
national wireline and wireless (including satellites). No commitment on
local service or one-way transmission by satellite of direct-to-home, direct
broadcast satellite and digital audio services. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Colombia-Market access and national treatment for private networks for
voice and data, paging, trunked radio, geostationary satellite and local
public voice services. Long-distance and international services subject to
an economic needs test. Market access and national treatment for cellular
services as of September 1, 1999, and PCS as of January 1, 2000, but sub-
ject to an economic needs test. Seventy percent foreign ownership permit-
ted for all services. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Cote D'Ivoire-Market access and national treatment for data, fax, tele-
graph, private circuits, mobile (voice and data), and PCS. Open for all sat-
ellite services except domestic and international public voice service. Mar-
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ket access and national treatment for local, long-distance, and international
voice and telex as of January 1, 2005. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Czech Republic-Market access and national treatment for closed user
groups, domestic and international data, telex, telegraph, fax, leased cir-
cuits and domestic mobile services; market access and national treatment
for domestic and international voice services as of 2001. Adopted the Ref-
erence Paper.
Denmark-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
Dominica-Market access and national treatment for nonpublic data, fixed
and mobile satellite systems, enhanced services and teleconferencing.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Dominican Republic-Market access (but no national treatment) for all
services (but must establish a commercial presence). Adopted the Refer-
ence Paper.
Ecuador-Market access and national treatment for domestic cellular
services. No regulatory commitments.
El Salvador-Market access and national treatment for all services.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Finland-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
France-Market access and national treatment for all services. Indirect in-
vestment is unlimited, but there is 20 percent direct foreign investment
limit for radio-based networks and 20 percent foreign investment limit on
investment in France Telecom. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Germany-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
Ghana-Duopoly for domestic and international voice. Market access and
national treatment for data, telex/telegraph, fax, closed user groups (not
connected to public switched network), Internet access services (excluding
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voice), teleconferencing, trunked radio, domestic fixed satellite and global
mobile satellite services but must provide through joint ventures with
Ghanian nationals. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Greece-Market access and national treatment for all services other than
public voice telephony and facilities-based services which will be open in
2003. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Grenada-Market access and national treatment for closed user groups,
enhanced services, and mobile and fixed satellite services through ar-
rangements with the incumbent operator. Market access and national
treatment for all other services as of January 1, 2006. Adopted the Refer-
ence Paper.
Guatemala *-Market access and national treatment for all services.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Hong Kong-Local wireline and wireless network services limited to cur-
rent four providers. Market access and national treatment for switched re-
sale, international data and fax by resale, call-back, resale-based virtual
private network service (not connected to the public switched network),
mobile satellite services, and self-provisions of external satellite circuits
by a company or closed user group permitted. Adopted the Reference Pa-
per.
Hungary-Market access and national treatment for data, telex/telegraph,
fax, leased circuits, satellite services (other than public voice). Market ac-
cess and national treatment for international and long-distance public voice
as of January 1, 2003, and local public voice as of January 1, 2004. Mobile
services limited to three operators until 2003. Paging limited to three op-
erators. One hundred percent foreign ownership permitted except 75 per-
cent limit for Matav and Antenna Hungaria Rt. Adopted the Reference Pa-
per.
Iceland-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
India-Duopoly for local and long-distance wireline. Duopoly for cellular,
and 25 percent foreign investment limit. No resale allowed. Additional li-
censes may be issued based on economic needs test. GSM technology
[Vol. 51
"WILDLY ENTHUSIASTIC"
mandated for cellular services. Adopted some of the Reference Paper but
with numerous changes. MFN exemption for accounting rates.
Indonesia-Public switched voice, circuit switched data, and teleconfer-
encing service, limited to provision by PT Telkom and five regional joint
operation scheme operators. Long-distance exclusive to PT Telkom.
Packet-switched public data provided by three operators on a nonexclusive
basis. Domestic telex/telegraph services must be provided through joint
venture or joint operation. Mobile cellular and PCS-selection of new op-
erators is subject to economic needs test and frequency availability and
must be through joint venture (and in case of PCS, with state-owned com-
pany). Paging-new operators subject to economic needs test, frequency
availability, and public interest test and a joint venture or joint operation is
required. Duopoly for international public switched voice, circuit switched
data, teleconferencing services, and Internet access services (until 2005).
Duopoly for domestic and international satellite services and international
telex/telegraph. Call-back prohibited. Thirty-five percent foreign owner-
ship. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Ireland-Market access and national treatment for all services other than
public voice telephony and facilities-based services which will be open as
of January 1, 2000. Mobile operators may interconnect with networks
other than the state-controlled company to supply international services
from January 1, 1999. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Israel-Market access and national treatment for private networks, cellu-
lar, paging, satellite voice and data, and international fax, with limit of 80
percent foreign investment for cellular. Market access and national treat-
ment for all other services as of January 1, 2002, with limitation of 74 per-
cent foreign ownership. Permits 80 percent foreign investment for wireless
service providers. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Italy-Market access and national treatment for all services, with limita-
tion on foreign investment in Stet. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Jamaica-Market access and national treatment for enhanced services,
digital mobile services, international voice, data and video transmission
services to firns involved in information processing located within free
zones. Exclusivity for all other services until September 2013. Adopted the
Reference Paper.
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Japan-Market access and national treatment for all services, with a 20
percent limit on foreign investment in KDD and NTT. Adopted the Refer-
ence Paper.
Korea-Market access and national treatment for all services. Foreign in-
vestment limitations-33 percent investment limit on facilities until Janu-
ary 1, 2001, then 49 percent (with individual shareholdings limited to 33
percent for wireless and 10 percent for wireline); 20 percent for Korea
Telecom until January 1, 2001, then 33 percent with individual sharehold-
ings limited to 3 percent; 49 percent for resellers until January 1, 2001,
100 percent thereafter. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Luxembourg-Market access and national treatment for all services.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Malaysia-Market access and national treatment for all services only
through acquisition of up to 30 percent of the shares of existing licensed
public telecom operators. No resale permitted. Made some regulatory
commitments.
Mauritius-Market access and national treatment for fax, paging, private
mobile radio, GMPCS and telecommunications equipment rental, sales and
maintenance services. Market access and national treatment for other
services markets by 2004 with no foreign investment restrictions other
than company registration requirement. No regulatory commitments.
Mexico-Market access and national treatment for all services except for
requirement to use Mexican satellites for the provision of domestic serv-
ices until 2002. One hundred percent foreign ownership for cellular serv-
ices; 49 percent for all other services. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Morocco-Market access (but no national treatment) for domestic packet
switched data, frame relay, mobile, paging, PCS and closed user groups.
Market access to "point-to-point voice telephone service" as of January 1,
2002. Made some regulatory commitments.
Netherlands-Market access and national treatment for all services.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
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New Zealand-Market access and national treatment for all services; ex-
cept limit of 49.9 percent foreign investment in New Zealand Telecom.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Norway-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
Pakistan-Market access and national treatment for domestic data, VSAT,
telex, fax, video conferencing, telemedicine, tele-education terminal end
services. Market access (but no national treatment) for other services until
2004. Made some regulatory commitments. MFN exception on accounting
rates.
Papua New Guinea*-Will review exclusivity for all telecom services two
years prior to expiration of license in 2002. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Peru-Market access and national treatment for local data, telex/telegraph,
fax, private leased circuits, cellular, PCS, paging, trunking services, and
mobile data. Market access and national treatment for all other services as
of June 1999. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Philippines *-Market access and national treatment for facilities-based
services except satellites, subject to a limit of 40 percent foreign owner-
ship. No commitment on resale or leased circuits/closed user groups.
Adopted some of the Reference Paper.
Poland-Market access and national treatment for local public voice
(wireline), domestic and international data, international fax, cellular, pan-
European paging systems, and international private leased circuits. Market
access and national treatment for telex and telegraph as of January 1, 2000.
Market access and national treatment for cellular and mobile satellite
services as of January 1, 2003. Market access and national treatment for all
other services as of January 1, 2004. Limit of 49 percent foreign invest-
ment in international and domestic long-distance services including cellu-
lar. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Portugal-Market access and national treatment for resale of all services.
Market access and national treatment for alternative facilities services as
of January 1, 1999. Market access and national treatment for public voice
telephony, telex and telegraph as of January 1, 2000. Adopted the Refer-
ence Paper.
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Romania-Market access and national treatment for nonpublic voice, data,
telex/telegraph, fax, paging, and VSAT (not connected to psn). Market ac-
cess for analog cellular as of April 1, 2002. Market access and national
treatment for all other services as of January 1, 2003. Adopted the Refer-
ence Paper.
Senegal-Market access and national treatment for all services (except
cellular and mobile satellites) as of 2006, although may be earlier due to
government commitment to consider additional access in 2003. Three cel-
lular providers as of 1998. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Singapore-Market access and national treatment for local and interna-
tional resale, resale of cellular mobile and paging services, paging, mobile
data and trunked radio. Market access and national treatment for all other
services as of April 1, 2000. Limit of 74 percent (combined direct and indi-
rect) foreign investment. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Slovak Republic-Market access and national treatment for data,
telex/telegraph, fax, private leased circuits, paging, trunked radio, domes-
tic mobile and PCS (excluding analog cellular voice) and closed user
groups (not connected to the psn). Market access and national treatment
for all other services as of January 1, 2003. Adopted the Reference Paper.
South Africa-Market access and national treatment for paging, PCS and
trunked radio services. Duopoly for local, long-distance, international,
data, telex, fax, and private leased circuits services as of January 1, 2004.
Duopoly for mobile but will license one more supplier within two years.
No commitment on satellite-based services but will schedule commitments
within one year of adoption of legislation in this area. Limitation of 30
percent foreign ownership. Liberalization of resale services to take place
between 2000 and 2003. Government will consider feasibility of additional
suppliers of public switched services and satellites services by December
31, 2003. Government will consider feasibility of additional cellular sup-
pliers by December 31, 1998. Adopted the Reference Paper.
Spain-Market access and national treatment for all services from Decem-
ber 1, 1998. Foreign investment limit for the government-owned firms
(Telefonica and Retevision). Adopted the Reference Paper.
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Sri Lanka-Market access and national treatment for data, paging and mo-
bile cellular but number of operators limited. Duopoly for international
services allowed as of January 1, 2000. Foreign ownership in excess of 40
percent requires government approval. Adopted the Reference Paper. MFN
exception for accounting rates.
Sweden-Market access and national treatment for all services. Adopted
the Reference Paper.
Switzerland-Market access and national treatment for all services.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Suriname-Market access and national treatment for local data, closed
user groups, mobile data, paging, and trunked radio services. Market ac-
cess and national treatment for other services as of January 1, 2003.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
Thailand-Market access and national treatment for all services as of
January 1, 2006. Foreign investment limited to 20 percent. No regulatory
commitments.
Trinidad & Tobago-Market access and national treatment for enhanced
services, trunked radio, cellular, PCS, and mobile satellite services. Market
access and national treatment for all other services as of 2010. Adopted the
Reference Paper.
Tunisia-Market access and national treatment for telex, packet-switched
data, and teleconference services as of January 1, 1999; mobile telephone,
paging, teleconferencing, and frame relay from January 1, 2000, and local
voice telephony as of January 1, 2003. Foreign ownership limited to 49
percent (10 percent in Tunisia Telecom). No regulatory commitments.
Turkey-Market access and national treatment for mobile, paging, and pri-
vate data networks, with a limitation of 49 percent foreign ownership.
Market access and national treatment for all other services as of January 1,
2006. Adopted some regulatory commitments on regulatory principles.
MFN exception for accounting rates and fees for transit land connections
and use of satellite ground stations.
United Kingdom-Market access and national treatment for all services.
Adopted the Reference Paper.
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United States-Market access and national treatment for all services ex-
cept direct-to-home, direct broadcast satellite, and digital audio transmis-
sion services, with a limit of 20 percent direct foreign investment in radio
licenses. Adopted the Reference Paper. MFN exception for one-way satel-
lite transmission of direct-to-home, direct broadcast satellite and digital
audio transmission services.
Venezuela-Market access and national treatment for all services as of
November 27, 2000. Adopted some of the Reference Paper.
